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A MODEL FOR PRIVATE STORAGE 
BEHAVIOR UNDER- COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 
WITH AN APPLICATION TO KOREAN RICE STORAGE 
Lloyd D. Teigen* 
Abstract
 
This paper analyzes storage behavior and price response 
when industry-wide profit maximization occurs (the case of 
.a monopoly or a cartel) and when the price rise just equals 
the average cost of storage (acharacterization of competitive
 
equilibrium for a storage industry). The model is based on
 
a linear demand curve with inventory costs per metric ton
 
stored which are assumed to be the sum of interest costs
 
plus a fixed storagc rate per month.
 
An empirical example using the parameters for Korean
 
rice storage aid marketing is used to illustrate the workings
 
of the model .. its results under the monopoly and
rd compare 

competitive atisumptions. The model serves to illustrate
 
the extent to ahich a monopoly can insulate itself from the
 
external forces of the market.
 
* Research Associate, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Michigan State University. This paper was written 
in Seoul, Korea, while the author was supported by 
and AID 211d grant to Michigan State University. This 
paper is not to be interpretted as the viewpoint of 
either the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
or Michigan State University. 
The cements of R. L. Gustafson, W. J. Haley, and 
V. L. Sorenson on an earlier draft are gratefu.ly 
_acknowledged. 	 They are to be absolved of any errors 
contained in this paper. 
Introduction 
Inventory policies are important aspects of the economics 
underlying the markets for all commodities. They are particu­
larly important in agriculture because of the temporally dis­
crete production process and the continuous consumption processes.
 
The time frame for the development of such storage 
policies may be from month to month or from year to year or 
possibly the focus is on the long run equilibrium storage 
levels. This study concentrates upon the month to month 
(short term) storage deoisions, with the capability to adjust
 
the yearly storage levels in the face of changing demand pros­
pects. Gustafson C 6g focused his attention on the year to 
year carryover with some analysis of the long run storage levels 
in equilibrium. 
The primary sector involved in the storage policy for­
milation my be a government agency [6, 8J or a private firm. 
The approach to the derivation of the storage policies may be 
to simulate the consequences of a number Of alternatives and 
then select one. 5, 8J or it may'invqlve specifying an 
optimality criterion and then analytically deriving the optimal 
policy on that basis [6J. The anaytical solutions to the 
Dpt*l storage policy might be derived for discrete points in 
time by a dynamic programing algor--thm [63 or as a continuous fun­
ction of time using the methods of*he calculus of variations, as in the
 
monopoly model developed in this study.
 
This paper, then, is addressing inventory policy by examidning the
 
behavior of private, profit motivated individuals, with an analytical
 
means to determine their behavior, utilizing the theory of differentitl
 
equations in both the competitive and monopolistic forms of the model,
 
with the primary relation in the monopolistic case derived using the
 
methods of the calculus of variations.
 
This pape. has four subsequent sections, dealing with the structure
 
of the model, interpreting the assumptions implied by the structure of
 
the model, mathematically analyzing the behavior of the model under
 
analyze

competitive and monopolistic assumptions, and using the model to 

Following

.the intra-year pattern of rice storage and marketing in Korea. 

these are brief statements which present a sumary of the conclusions 
of
 
the paper and offer suggestions for further related research.
 
The first two present
There are three appendices to this paper. 

the detailed algebraic analysis of the storage model under the competitive
 
The third appendix

assumption and under the monopolistic assumption. 

reviews the basic.principles of the calculus of variations, including
 
both the necessary and sufficient conditions for minimizing a functional.
 
Structure of the Model
 
Storge 1e'el
 
t (0): + (H(y) + G(y). - D(y)) dy. 
Va, z (-)t)+ -k:&(t) 
4 
Demand Equation 
P(t) a - b (D(t) + G(t)). 
Storage Profit Level 
r,(t) =(O) + P(y) (-S'(y))- IC(y)_dy. 
Farm Harvest RateV
 
- .
H(t) H '56 t3 e 4t
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Government Sales Rate
 
G(t) c(-i/3 + t/l8).
 
Gross Farm Income
 
FY(t) = FY(O) + soP(y) H(y) dy.
 
Consumer Expenditure
 
X(t) = X(O) + P(y) D(y) dy. 
Revenue from Government Sales
 
T(t) = TX(O) + P(y) G(y) d. 
Behavior Assumptions
 
In the monopolistic case, the storago level S(t),, and hence
 
sales to consumers D(t)g' is determined in such a way as to
 
max4mize year-end profits from private storage activity,T(12).
 
Table 1: Variables and Parameters Within the Model 
Endogenous Variables
 
P(t) = Price w/MT, 
D(t) = Sales rate to consumers MT/Month 
S(t) = Private storage level MT 
IC(t) = Inventory cost rate 	 W/Month
 
=
lr(t) Accumulated profit level W
 
FY(t) = Accumulated farm income W
 
X(t) = Accumulated consumer expenditure on
 
the commodity W
 
=
TX(t) 	 Accumulated revenue from government
 
sales, ignoring government storage costs W
 
Predetermined Variables
 
H(t) = 'Harvest rate MT/Month
 
G(t) = Government sales rate MT/Month
 
Parameters
 
r = Interest rate %/Month
 
k = Warehousing costs (W/MT)/Month
 
= 
a Price intercept W
 
b = Price response to total demand W/(MT/Month)
 
C = Government inventory capacity MT
 
=
H - Level of farm harvest 	 MT/Year
 
* 	 Won per metric ton. At the current time $1.00 U.S. = 400 Won 
Korean, approximately. 
In the competitive case, storage levels and sales 
to consumers are such that the month.-to-month rise in 
prices is just sufficient to equal the average cost of 
holding inventories. 
Interpreta-ion of the Model 
The storage equation reflects the identity which states
 
that if additions to the private supply (harvest plus govern­
ment sales) exceed the withdrawals for private consumption
 
(or sales by the private sector to the public) the inventory
 
of the commodity will increase.
 
The inventory cost equation states that there are two 
components of the (variable) costs of storage. The interest 
charge is based upon the instantaneous value of the inventory. 
By so doing the annual aggregate (integral over the year)
 
of these charges is equal to the annual interest rate
 
multiplied by the average value of the inventory over the
 
year. The second component of inventory cost indicates that
 
there are storage costs that vary directly with the physical
 
size of the inventory irrespective of its value. Such costs
 
might include the costs of operating heating, cooling of
 
drying equipment, the costs from quality deterioration and 
7 
theft, and the losses due to rodents and bin leakage. Costs 
which depend more upon the changes in the inventory, such as
 
loading and unloading, and buying and selling costs, could 
affect the form or the parameters of the solution under the 
two cases, but are not analyzed in this paper.
 
The demand equation, which determines the price in
 
this model, states that price responds to the rates of private
 
plus government demand in the same degree. If the government 
is purchasing (G(t) is negative), the price will be higher 
than itwould be if the government is selling, for a given 
level of privatc.consumption. This formulation assumes that 
any income effects which may alter the level or form of the 
demand relationship occur at the outset of the year, but 
are unchanging through the year. It further assumes that 
there is no seasonal price functions which cannot be explained 
by quantity variations. 
The profit equation assumes that the same price is paid 
or received for the comodity whether it is being purchased
 
or sold. Moreover, it assumes that the government pays the 
same prices for both buying and selling as consumers or private 
8 
storage firms do. No buying or selling costs are assumed in 
this model. '.The profits in the model derive from buying the 
commodity when it is plentiful and the prices are low and 
selling it later when the prices are higher, taking account 
of the costs of holding the inventory. The time interval 
O, 12J is assumed to be such that it begins at the outset 
of harvest and ends just prior to the next harvest.
 
The interpretation of H(t) as a harvest rate implies 
that the farmers participate in the storage activities. 
The sales from farmers to commercial warehouses at times 
other than harvest are ignored under this interpretation 
because the profit from the farmer's storage to that point 
would be a cost to the comercial warehouse and the storage 
profit equation represents the sum of the farm plus commercial 
storage profits. The model assumes that the farmer's produc­
tion activity is reimbursed at the price which prevails at 
the moment of harvest and that farm consumption is included 
with urban consumption in D(t). 
The particular form of the harvest equation assumes 
that harvest is distributed according to a fourth order gamma 
probability function with mean of one month and'standard 
9 
deviation of i month. Table 1 shows that the assumed harvest 
is more than 95% completed by the end of the second month 
of the harvest season. In this model, the crop year and the 
time indexing begins at the time the harvest begins. 
Table 1: Assumed Harvest Rate 
Months since the Percentage of Crop
 
Start of Harvest yet to be Harvested
 
.000 100.0% 
.918 50.0% 
1.670 10.0% 
1.940 5.0% 
2.511 1.0%
 
3.266 0.1% 
The government purchase equation reflects the assumption 
that the government agency buys the grain at a linearly 
decreasing rate for six months, at which time all of its 
storage facilities will be full, and then begin to sell from 
its stocks at the same linearly increasing rate for the next 
six months3. The government behavior equation analyzed in 
this paper assumes that there would be no net government 
imports and no quantity losses from storage. 
Analysis of the Model 
In this section of the paper we will analyze the storage 
model under an assumption of competitive behavior and under 
an assumption of monopolistic behavior. The competitive 
assumption is that prices will rise only as much as the per 
unit cost of storing the conmodity [2, p. 2113. If the 
prices were expected to rise by more than this amount, larger 
inventories will be held, resulting in higher' current period 
prices and lower future prices and hence a smaller price change.
 
Likewise, should prices be expected to rise by less than this
 
amount, smaller inventories would be held increasing future 
prices at the expense of current prices, and the price change
 
would be largerj
 
The monopolistic assumption is that the industry can
 
manage its inventory levels and selling behavior in such a
 
way as to maximize the profits from storage for the entire
 
industry. Implicit in this situation is the assumption that
 
the industry does have all the relevant information in terms
 
of parameters and relationships available to it when it is
 
deriving its storage strategy.
 
Before beginning the analysis, two important algebraic 
substitutions will be made: from the definition of storage 
n
 
=
level, we obtain that S'(t) H(t) + G(t) - D(t) or
 
D(t) =H(t) + G(t) - SI(t). This can be substituted into 
the demand equation or obtain P(t) = a + bS'(t) - bH(t) - 2bG(t). 
This relates the price level to the storage function which 
is going to be Our primary control instrument. 
Storage Behavior under Competitive Assumptions. Our
 
assumption regarding the competitive market was that prices
 
would change the same amount as the storage costs per metric
 
ton of the commodity. Algebraically, this is equivalent to
 
=
P(t) IC(t)/S(t) = rP(t) + k. This differential equation 
could be solved as it is, or as is done here, solved to 
determine the storage levels by substituting the demand 
equation for P(t). This gives rise to the f6llowing differ­
ential equation involving storage 
S"(t) - rS'(t) = ra+k- rf(t) + f'(t),
b
 
where f(t) = H(t) + 2G(t) is the portion of the price equation
 
which depends explicitly upon time. With our particular storage
 
and government sales equations the equation becomes'
 
-
s,,(t) - rS,(t) = ra+k + 2C(! + E) .Ct/9 + (3t2-(4+r)t 3 )H4, e4t. b 18 3 31 
The general solution to this nonhomogeneous second order 
differential equation is 
S(t) =s o + Slert - r + 2 )t + Ct2 - He 4 t3 
The numerical constants So and S1 are determined by the
 
boundary conditions imposed upon storage behavior inthe 
particular situation. Ifwe impose the conditions that 
there is no carry-in and no carry-out (i.e. S(O) = S(12) 0) 
we can derive the values of the S0 and S1 parameters 
/
 
(He2r - 12(rr ))/(el 2 r l) andO -
S1, (32 (ra+k) H)/(e'12r-1).
rb 
If the.carr'y-in equaled the carry-out, but equaled a minimum
 
level of working stocks, rather than zero, So would be
 
increased by the amount of these working stocks and S1 would
 
not be changed.
 
FrorA this solution we can determine the rate at which 
the storage level changes through time to be 
e .
s,(t) - r Sl - .(±ra+k) + 26(t) + H(t).
rb 
This implies that the price level isdetermined to.be 
P(t)hb rsit - k/r. 
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From these equations it is possible to derive expJ1ci 
algebraic formula for the remaining endogenous variables in 
the model (gross farm income, consumer expenditure, gross 
margin on government sales). Indeed, these have been derived 
and are included in an algebraic appendix to this paper. 
For the most part, the equations provide few insights into 
the operation of the model.
 
One exception is the derivation of profit in this coni­
petitive case. The profit is found to be: 
_q3)= -br=-br (12 (rl±) H)S(O).-H - ~) 
rb 
This means that if the carry-in at the beginning of the year 
no net profits realizedis zero, there will be, on balance, 
by the storage sector. Thus the expectation of zero profit 
in competitive equilibrium is fulfilled. 
of this paper will present the analysisThe next subsection 
of the storage model under the assumption of a monopoly organi­
sation of the storage industry.
 
Storafe Behavior under Monopolistic Assumptions. If
 
the storage industry was a monopoly, the single firm eould 
be able to manage its inventory levels in such a way that 
the industry profit from storage wou2d be maximized. Thus 
4, 
our waasis of storage under monopolistic conditions is 
derived from the assumption that year-end storage profits, 
#(22)p are max.mi sed by the choice of an appropriate storage 
policy. 
f(2 +5S32[Zp(y)QaX2) 71(Q) (-S'(y) - Ic(Y)dy3 
0Ot$12 
Because both the price and the inventory cost are 
functions of the storage level, its rate of change and time, 
we can put our objective function into the form 
jC12 F(SS't)dt, the maximization (or minimization) 
of which isthe first 'generalproblem inthe Calculus of 
Variations. 
A necessary condition for a function S(t) to be an 
extremal solution to the problem is that it satisfy the 
Euler E~uation: 
-Pa(ss,t) d _F(Ss't) o.is dt 'S 
For our particular problem we have
 
rP(t)+ k
 
ZS 
' P(t) + (s,(t) + rs(t)) and 
t " F-b S' - bf' + b(S" + rS. 
where f(t) - H(t) + 2G(t) is the portion of the price 
equation which depends explicitly upon time* hus, the 
Baler equation is 
Sol ra2b _ 2rf + 1 . 
With our particular assumptions regarding the harvest rates 
and government behavior made explicit, the Euler Equation 
becomes 
"2S" ra+k+ 2C(K + 1) - Crt+ 128 Ht2 e- 4 t - (4+) Ht3e 4 t. 
rb 318 9 3 
The solution to this differential equation, with
 
exception of two parameters (S and SI) to be determined by
o 

the boundary conditions, is 
- Cr t3 1I(ra+k)+ b (l+6r))t2 
4 b 36 108 
- He-4t (('+r) + (2+l.5r)t + (4+2r)t2 + (16+4r)t3).
2 3 
If, as in the competitive case, we determine these two 
parameters based on the assumption of zero carry-in and carry­
out (S(O) = S(12) - 0), these are the specific parametersl/ 
which result: 
-("+)Hs o 
.2 
-5sin: (r)H~3~~ (l+2r) 
Agaiifa. minimaslevel of working stocks were desired, 
swould be increasedacoordingyp,but Swould not be changed. 
The rate of change of storage isdetermined from this to be 
s'(t (rk4r))t- 1, tC.~+ Ae t(O. +2t-+4t 24  t 3 )2b3

H(t).
 
2
 
And this gives rise to the price equation, which is
 
P(t)a a +,2+ bS+ (ba+ * - (6rl))t rbC t2 
3 l 2 l+ 8 3(6-)36
 
- I bH(t) + rbHe-4t(o.5+2t+4t2+1 t 3 ).2 3 
All of these equations together enable one to obtain
 
explicit algebraic representations for all of the other endoge­
nous variables under this monopolistic form of the model. In 
an algebraic appendix to this paper the expressions for gross 
farm income, consumer expenditure and gross margin from government 
sales are presented. The expression for private sector profit 
in this monopolistic case was not calculated because of the 
complexity of the expression. In most empirical applications one 
would use a computer program to trace out the consequences for 
a particular set of data and the numerical evaluation would be 
most expediant. 
In the next section of this paper we will discuss the results 
of an empirical application of this model to the case of rice 
storage and marketing in Korea. In this discussion the com­
petitive and the monopolistic versions of the model are con­
trasted and'.some obaervations are Wade regard ig the empirical 
geerwasation. of the model for POliay purposes.• 
IT 
Korean Rice Storage and Marketing -
An Bnpiricial Application 
Ths discussion will present an empirical application of 
this model of storage behavior to describe the .ntra-year
 
response of rice marketings and storage in Korea. This will
 
consist of a presentation of the basic parameter values used
 
in the model, a description of the response of the storage
 
model under the competitive assumption, a description of the
 
response of the model under the monopolistic assumption, and
 
some concluding remarks on the two forms of the model and its
 
implications for policy makers.
 
Basic Data Used in the Model: The empirical numbers which
 
are used in this application of the model are taken to represent 
the situation pertaining to the marketing environment for 
domestic Korean rice in quite broad terms. While careful 
thought preceded the choice of the parameter values, they are
 
not being represented as the results of any exhaustive econometric 
study. 
At the heart of this model is the demand equation. This 
is assumed to be line&% with no intra-yoar income effects, 
and in price-dependent form. This is assumed to have an own­
price elasticity of -0.4 at the price of 225 won/kilogram 
-and the consumption rate of one-tiztd of a million metric tons 
per month-. Thus, price (in won per metric ton) is given by
 
this 	relation:
 
P = 437500 - 0.9375 Q.
 
The harvest level is assumed to be four million metric
 
tons 	per year, which is virtually the same as the 1971 pro­
duction of 3.998 million metric tons-. The implicit assump­
tions 	regarding the timing of harvest are discussed in the
 
section "Interpretation of the Model." 
The assumed interest rate is 1.5 percent per month,
 
which is the same rate charged by the Medium Industry Bank for
 
operation loans-. Some interest rates on loans are higher and
 
some 	lower. If anything, this rate may be lower than the
 
opportunity dost of capital for many storage enterprises, since
 
the so-called "curb-market" rates are much higher than the
 
official bank rates.
 
The noninterest cost of storage is assumed to be 250 won
 
per metric ton per month. The current year MAF specification
 
of storage charges for polished rice in Seoul is 9.55 won per 
metric ton per day, ,wthan insurance fee of 1.32 won/ton/day,.
 
inaddition to that*.
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The government storage capacity is assumed to be 700,000 
metric tons . This is assumed to be filled by buying for six 
months at a linearly decreasing rate, and then emptied by sell­
ing at that same rate.
 
Response of the Competitive Model: The competitive model
 
assumed that prices rose only to the extent that the average
 
cost per metric ton of storage was covered by that price rise.
 
As was mentioned in the theoretical analysis of the model, this
 
assumption gives rise to a specific differential equation which
 
determined storage levels, and hence, consumption rates and
 
prices.
 
The competitive model determined that it was necessary
 
at the beginning of the crop year to have working stocks of
 
rice in the private storage sector at least in the amount of
 
135,200 metric tons to enable all demands to be met without 
resulting in negative storage levels. The maximum level of 
privately stored rice calculated by the model is slightly more than 
2.5 million metric tons. This is somewhat more than twice the 
1971 USAID estimate of total storage capacity E13, but the 
two estimates may not be comparable since .the estimate of this 
20 
model includes farm storage for farm consumption and for 
off-farm sale att later times of the year, as well as commer­
cial storage. 
The rate of total rice consumption through the year 
decreases in an a~most linear fashion from the rate of 580 
thousand tons per month as the harvest begins to 86 thousand 
tons per month at the end of the crop year. Perfectly uniform 
consumption would be at the rate of 333 thousand tons per
 
month throughout the year. 
Corresponding to this consumption pattern, the price 
level steadily increases from 112.6 won per kilogram at the 
beginning of the year to 138.1 won per kilogram at the end 
of the year. This increase follows an exponential growth 
path (similar ,to compound interest). 
The value of the rice production in terms of these prices 
is 458.4 billion won. This is about 20 percent higher than 
the 1971 value of rice production of 373.4 billion won, but 
there are no marketing and transportation costs assumed in 
this model. 
The total consumer expenditure on rice in the example 
is 487. 4 billion won. 
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The accumulated gross margin at the end of the year from 
the governmental storage activity is 11.9 billion won, with
 
the largest deficit which is incurred during the year equal 
to 81.6 billion won. 
The costs and returns of the private sector storage
 
operation which are indicated by the model are as follows.
 
The accumulated interest plus noninterest costs of storage at
 
the end of the year amount to 20.6 billion won. The model
 
calculates a year-end loss from storage activities of 3.468 
billion won, which is equal to the annual cost of holding a 
carryover of 135,200 tons plus a numerical discrepancy-' 
of 21 million won, about 10 won per year per person who might 
be involved in storage activity. The largest deficit incurred 
during the year by the private storage sector (indicating the 
magnitude of the working credit requirements of the sector)
 
is 277.3 billion won. 
Figure I illustrates the time pattern of consumption 
rates, price level, and storage level as calculated by the 
model under the competitive assumption. 
As a crude test of the applicability of the model in 
describing the pattern of rice marketing in Korea both the 
output of this storage model and Korean corresponding data 
Response 
Figure 1 
of the Competitive Storage Model 
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were indexed so that the maximum intra-year value was 1000, 
and the variance of the errors of the indexed data around 
the indexed output was compared with the variance of the 
-2 
indexed data. This ratio will be 1 - R , the adjusted 
correlation coefficient, for the proportional relationship
 
between the model output and the actual data.
 
The relation between the storage level of the model and
 
per capita farm storage for September through September rice 
-2
 
years from 1964 to 1971 indicated an R of .830 for this
 
competitive model.
 
The calculated consumption rates compare more with farm
 
-2
 
marketing than with consumption per se. The equivalent R 
was .324 for the comparison with rice taken into Seoul for 
November through October years from 1963 to 1968P. The 
comparisons of the model's calculated consumption with either
 
farm or nonfarm household consumption resulted in negative 
-2

R equivalents. 
The comparison of the ind.°.ed output to the indexed 
prices of rice received by farmers in October through October 
-2 
rice years from 1964 to 1971 resulted in an R equivalent of 
.580. 
24
 
Since there seems to be a reasonable correspondence
 
between the real world data for Korea and the results indicated 
by this competitive model, there would appear to be a degree 
of empirical validity in the comparison of this model with 
the monopolistic model of the next section. 
25 
Response of the on6olistic Model: The storage model is 
being analyzed under monopolistic assumptions in the Korean 
setting primarily to provide a contrasting case for the com­
petitive mod-il. However, there is a dominating firm (Korean 
&press Company) in the private storage industry which controls 
storage capacity for 244 thousand metric tons of bagged grain 
ZJ13. This was almost as much capacity as all other private 
storage firms in Korea by the USAID estimate. If the response 
of the monopolistic version of the model provided a better 
explanation of the data for the Korean rice marketing system 
than the competitive model, we could then conclude that this 
dominant firm is able to exercise significant control over
 
the market.
 
The response of the monopolistic model will be described
 
as the solution to the storage profit maximizing equation and, 
because of the nature of that response, the response of the model
 
when the storage levels and corresponding derivati.ve is twice 
that indicated by the profit maximizing equations. Tn the. 
modified version of the monopolistic model, the same forcing 
function acts on the differential equation for storage as is 
felt in the competitive model. 
The Wuler equation for this maximizing model states that 
the storage levels of a storage monopoly are changed so that 
26 
at each tieoint Lthe rate .of 'chage of the marginal revenue 
*f .torag u qa to temria ot(hc ti
 
aseqasthe. avrage cost) of, storage. 
 This cempares with 
the rate of change in Coe. 
quals the avage cost (which is equal to the marginal cost)
 
of storage.
 
In-the profit maxizing model the working stocks necessary 
at the beginning of the year to meet al demands while maintain­
ing positive storage levels in 791.10 metric tons. Under this
 
version of the model the maximum 
 storage levels are 1.26 million 
tons, or about 100 thousand tons more than the 1971 USAID estimate 
Z313J of total capacity 
.to store bagged grain in Korea. 
In this profit maximizing version of the model, the rate
 
of consumption rises from 168 thousand tons per month at the
 
beginning of the year to a peak rate of 1.'955 miUion tons per 
month at the time of peak harvest (about 25 days after the 
start of harvest) and then drops off to a rate of 154 thousand 
to"s per month at the end of the year. As before, the unifom 
rate of conamptiOn is333 thousand tons per month. 
The price pattern wh~h oorresponds 
.to this consumption 
rate start at. 50 won perkilogram at the begitning of the 
eadrops to the negatiVetprie of 1206:won, per kilogram. at
 
tep1t' of' peak ccst 
 ie o la madi== -of :366' 
Figure 2
 
Response of the onopolistic Storage. Model
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wonperkilgra theemonths: after harvest_ iad the drops
 
to 74 won per kilogram &t theend of the crop year.
 
Because of the negative prices at the time of peak pro­
duction and peak consumption, this wvrsion of the model 
computes a negative value of production (-2869 billion won) 
and a negative value of consumption (-1240 billion won). 
The year end cumulative gross margin from government
 
storage activity is 173.6 billion won, or nearly 15 times the
 
level in the competitive model, reflecting the impact of the
 
negative prices during its acquisition period.
 
The private sector storage profits in this profit maximiz­
ing version of the model are 1498 billion won. In this version 
of the model the storage sector is generating revenue on both
 
the purchase and sale of inventory stocks, i.e. stocks are 
I I 
being built up while the price is negative and are being drawn
 
down when the price is positive (the ultimate in a buy-low,
 
sel.1-high strategy). 
Figure I presentsthe response of the storage model 
-underthe monopolistic assumption. The seane scale is used for 
storage levels as for the competitive model, however, the 
scale for consumption is three times that in the competitive 
Gase -nd for prie is fifteen times the scale in the competitive 
case. 
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The storage pattern conformed reasonably well to the far 
-2 
storage pattern for rice with an R equivalent of .811. The­
difference between the level of storage under this monopolistic 
model and that under the competitive model has already been 
noted.
 
-The comparison of the calculated consumption of the
 
monopoly model with the rice shipments to Seoul indicated an
 
-2 
equivalent R of -0.307, which meant that the average monthly 
shipment described that variation better than the monopoly
 
model output.
 
The comparison with the prices received by farmers for
 
-2 
rice indicated an R of -69, which indicated the predicted 
prices were greatly inferior to the average price as an expla­
nation. This would be expected because of the negative predicted 
vilues. 
These results seem to serve as a quantitative support
 
for thq rejection of this monopolistic form of the storage
 
model as a representation of the behavior of the Korean rice
 
markets within a year. 
Beoause the difference between the response of the monopo­
listic model above and that of the coMpetitive model of the 
pr.dt subsetion i. so great, one might .wader if it is 
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due to the foru of the differential equation or due, to the 
difference in the empolitude of the forcing function being 
applied io the equation. To answer this equation, the forcing 
function in the differential equation for monopolistic storage 
was set equal to the forcing function of the competitive model 
(i.e. it was doubled) and the model's response was observed.
 
In this version, then, the minimum carryin necessary to
 
satisfy all demands while maintaining positive storage levels
 
is 158220 metric tons. The maximum level of private storage
 
is 2.52 million metric tons. These exceed the corresponding
 
values from the competitive model by 23 thousand and 10
 
thousand tons, respectively.
 
The rate of consumption in this version decreases almost
 
monotonicall.y from 569 thousand metric tons per month at the
 
beginning of the year to 75 thousand metric tons per month 
at the end of the year with an almost imperceptible trend
 
reversal in the first month followed by a more rapid rate
 
of decrease starting in the second month of the crop year.
 
That is, consumption does not decrease as fast in the first
 
two months of the year as it does later. 
Corresponding to this rate of consumption, the prices 
start at 123.won per kilogr,.and drop to 93 won per kilogram 
in the second month after the beginning of harvest. After
 
that, the prices continuously rise at a decreasing rate to
 
the year-end price of 148 won per kilogram.
 
This version of the model values rice-production at
 
428.5 billion won and consumers spend 469.4 billion won on 
rice. Both of these values are less than those in the
 
competitive case (30 billion won and 18 billion won less,
 
respectively).
 
The government 'saccumulated gross margin from its
 
storage activities is 26.4 billion won, with the largest
 
accumulated deficit in this storage account being 74.6
 
billion won. 
The profit and loss accruing to the private storage 
sector under this variant of the monopolistic model is 
quite similar to that in the competitive model. The sector 
as a whole showed a year-end loss of 4.062 billion won of. 
which all but 28 million won is the cost of holding the 
necessary working stocks. The accumulated private inventory 
costs are 38.5 billion won at the end of the year. The 
largest intra-year deficit in the private storage sector is 
260 billion won, which is the amount of short term financing 
which the private storage sector will need. 
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Figure 3 presents the response of prices, consumption 
and storage under this versLon of the monopolistic model with 
increased external forces acting on it. All scales in this 
figure are identical to those in the competitive model to 
facilitate direct comparison. 
The comparison of this storage response with farm 
-2 
storage levels indicates the same R as the pure monopoly 
model (.811) because of the proportionality of the two 
responses, but the absolute level is more comparable to
 
that of the competitive model.
 
The comparison of the predicted consumption rates with
 
farm marketings, as indicated by rice shipments to Seoul, 
-2 
resulted in an R equivalent of .283, which is somewhat 
less than that for the competitive model. 
The predicted price pattern from this version of the 
model was not as good a predictor of farm rice prices as 
was the pattern generated by the competitive model. The 
-2 
indicated R for this case was .106. 
Taken in total, thee comparisons seem to indicate that 
Uhe predictions of the monopoly storage models, in either 
fozu, are inferior to those of the copetitive model. 
bin thoiugh the largest private grain storage company 
(Zrmhp O.CIOmpn has about Iten'.percent. of the indicated 
34 
total private storage requirements (244 thousand metric tone 
in 1970 C3 1), its behavior has" not resulted in other than 
competitive performance of the rice marketing and storage 
sotor, at least as indicated by the published data consulted 
In this study. Hover, if the dominant firm in an industry 
controls only ten percent of that market, there is usually 
littl e pectation of monopolistic behavior. 
This analysis of the storage model under the monopolistic 
aer~umption demonstrated that if the private storage sector 
were allowed to collude in order to jointlyr maximize storage 
sector profits, performance which is not usually desired would 
be the result. Less of the crop would be stored after harvest, 
there would be a large intra-year price variation - including 
negative prices, and producer income would be depressed. 
The reason that the pure monopolistic model resulted 
in such performanoe is that the force that the market is 
applying to the itorage sector is much weaker under monopoly 
than under competition. When the same external force is 
applied to the differential equation for the monopolistic 
form of the modelp the overall, response is quite similar to 
that of the competitive model with the only major eception 
being a midyear sa in prices. 
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Concluding Remarks n Korean Rice SLorae: Even though 
this paper is not intended to be a thorough analysis of the 
policy options which are available to rice price planners, there 
are some observations on market behavior that show through the
 
model's resulto*.
 
The first observation is that the operation of government's
 
grain management fund for purposes of intra-year price stabili­
zation can be a profitable operation, particularly if there is
 
no interference with the normal operation of the pricing mechanism.
 
The non-interest costs of storing the government inventory is
 
about 317 million won, or less than one percent of the accumulated
 
gross margin from government storage activity under the competitive
 
model. If the government paid the same interest rate as the
 
private sector the total (interest plus noninterest) costs would
 
be about 20 million won less than the government's accumulated
 
gross margin in the competitive case, and equal to 14.6 billion
 
won giving the government an indicated profit of 11.8 billion
 
won in the case of the augmented monopoly model. Because the
 
grain management fund receives subsidized credit, theseo figures
 
would understate the government gains from storage. 
Th. second observation is that other rules governing 
go0VMAM t ,.purchase and sales behavior, while. not exmined in'. 
this paper, can also be analyzed by -this model. with a nimmm 
of modification. If purchases were proportional to the diff­
erence between the actual price and a target price, all that 
would be necessary is the re-interpretation of the two parameters
 
In this case, there would not necessarily
of the demand equation. 

be the balance between purchase and sales which is built into
 
this formulation, and imports (or exports) would make up the
 
difference. In this case, however, I have not devised a way
 
of incorporating the government storage capacity constraint
 
into this model without substantial revision of the current
 
structure.
 
It is also possible to use this model to itermine-the
 
storage pattern which maximizes gross farm income. The storage 
pattern under that policy would probably be much different 
from those analyzed in this paper. 
One might want to analyze the effect of different levels 
of government storage capacity on the response of the model,
 
e.g. prices. storage levels, faru income, government storage 
profit, etc. 4z so doing, much of the material needed for the 
benefits of storae could be generated to be used in a benefit ­
cost anasis. One limit in this analysis would be the 
response in the case of no government storage. 
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A third observation regards the intertemporal pattern
 
of prices. This model shows that under anmy reasonably free 
market in whic production occurs only in certain times of the
 
year when consumption is spread , )ugh the year, prices must
 
rise enough to cover the costs of storage, or there will not
 
be a freely motivated transfer of goods from one time period
 
to the next. In that circumstance, there would be substantial
 
pressure to force up the price on the remaining supplies.
 
Thus, a program which expects to achieve total pr ce stability 
(constant,prices throughout the year) while relying on private
 
industry to carry out the storage function, is destined to
 
fail, because the private storage sector requires a minimum 
price rise to enable it to cover its costs.
 
The model shows that no excessive profits are being
 
made by the storage industry and, as a matter of fact, the
 
industry is not quite obtaining the opportunity cost of
 
their working capital. This is because of the costs of
 
maintaining the working stocks and the relatively small losses 
that the sector experiences in addition to the costs of the 
working stock. The on2 reasons that actual storage profits 
might be excessive are that the fixed storage charges contained 
pfit rates which were themselves eXCessive or that the 
38. 
interest rates used in the analysis exceed the true opportunity 
cost of capital to storage firms. 
Finaly, 'this model seems to present a fairly reason­
of storage behavior and inter-temporalably representation 
price and consumption response. It should then be used as a 
basis for analyzing the effects of price and storage policy 
available fordecisions, at least until a better model is 
these purposes.
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Smunary- and Conclusions 
In this paper we presented a model of storage behavior 
in which the average costs of storage consist of the interest
 
on the inventory investment plus a fixed amount per month, 
and price is set by the demand curve, given a predetermined 
level-of harvest. Particular assumptions were made regarding 
the timing of the harvest and the form of the purchase response 
followed by the government storage sector, so as to obtain 
more concrete results from the analysis. Specifically, it 
was assumed that the government bought and sold the commodity 
at the prevailing free market price at the time of sale, and 
filled its inventory capacity by purchasing at a linearly 
decreasing rate for six months and then selling at the same 
linearly increasing rate for the next six months and that the 
harvest was distributed according to a fourth order Ganma 
density function with the mean equal to one month and the 
standard deviation equal to one-half month. 
This model was analyzed under two behavioral assumptions. 
First, the rate of change of prices is equal to the average 
Cost of storage, which defined the response of the model under 
ocampetitive conditions. The second assumption is that total 
imlust47 storage profits are midmised during the storage, 
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q1YJm"W to.: equating the.Irate 
of the Margioa "el%*' W.Vstoa to Vie m gilcot of 
stfg.t- second asivtiop defined -the response of the, 
Vin5DWidbs of change 
BMed upon the response of the two forms of the model 
under. parameters approximating the situation of rice storage 
in Korea we were able to conpare the performance of the storage 
industry under competition and monopoly. The most striking 
conclusion was that the storage level in the monopolistic case 
rose to onl. half the level achieved in the competitive case, 
as a result of the insulation that a monopolistic storage 
sector has from the external forces of the market. This level 
of storage was not sufficient to prevent the price of the 
caimodity from plUmneting to negatie levels at harvest time 
and rapid4y rising during a post-harvest storage before the 
government starts to sell from their stocks. 
Becau~~e the..monopolistic form of the model appears to 
followr. a policy of buying, while the price is negative and 
sellM oive pais, te 'comtitive form of the model 
seem to be1pref.rred fo mos a s of storage behavior. 
Theresltsof he aq~titvemodel when applied to the 
ase of ~t n rice seem si inot2 credible +to.warrant -its 
us. mn1m5o heeffc oo storage policiesIF of pridin 
affect'' t i u o of Korean. ulture...
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V-gestions for Further Research 
The analysis of this paper deals with the situation of
 
a single commodity being stored and consumed. In later studies
 
it would be particularly useful to generalize the results
 
of this-model to the case of multiple commodities, with non­
zero cross elasticities of demand and possible competition
 
for the use of both private and government storage facilities.
 
From a policy-maker's viewpoint, itwould be desirable 
to view the consequences of a number of alternative policies 
regarding government storage behavior, possibly including tests 
of different policy response parameters. Some of these 
that might be considered were mentioned in the "Concluding 
Remarks on Korean Rice Storage." 
A third extension of the model incorporate the effects
 
of constraints on storage capacity (both public and private)
 
into the model in a more explicit fashion than is currently
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Footnotes
 
The structure of these two equations is determined at
 
least in part by the empirical content of the Korean
 
situation whidh will be analyzed later in the paper.
 
Any other functions with continuous first derivatives
 
should work as well in other situations. Justification
 
of these two forms will come later: (see pp. 9-10).
 
The sales to consumers, D(t), are determined from the
 
change in inventory, given the predetermined harvest
 
rate and government market activity.
 
In the competitive case, this type of specification
 
would give rise to a nonlinear, nonhomogeneous differ­
ential equation of second order.
 
If H(t) is interpreted as a farm sales rate, the
 
storage profit is that of the commercial storage
 
sector, rather than that which accrues to all storage.
 
In this case, D(t) would represent only urban (or nonfarm)
 
consumption.
 
It is realized that this is only one of many
 
alternative assumptions which could be used to
 
describe this exogeneous input to the private
 
storage model. Another quite plausiole, and
 
equally as tractible, assumption is that government
 
sales are proportional to the difference between the
 
realized price and a target price, i.t.. if the realized
 
price is "too high" the government would be selling,
 
while it would buy if the actual price were "too low."
 
thder this assumption net imports would be calculated as
 
the residual difference between accumulated purchases
 
and accumulated sales. 
Such dynamic disequilibrium phenomena as recognition
 
and decision lags are not being considered in this
argument. 
- ohe6actual parameters, and -SD: differ from the 
~al~scopuedin. the expeson team of, the.
 
order of zlipitude Aprda 17101~
 
(.3r4)is~ubraoedfro ~and added
 
/For probl.mw:ecan interpret the' first termof the
 
D~e eqa4o stemrilcost of'storage and the
 
secoter asthe rate of'change o~f the margi~nal

revenue fro torae. .Thus .the er equation states
 
that a monopols*tic storage industry is inequilibrium

when the rate of change of the marginal revenue equals
 
the marginal cost of storage.
 
1/-lactually also contains another term which is of order 
less than 10-11 inmagnitude. This is+ e-48 (9816.5+2610.5r). 
The elasticity is the same as that used inother KASS
 
Analyes .'8,. The price level is the level at which
 
rice prices are currently set by the government and
 
the quantity level is one-twelfth of the assumed harvest.
 
R/ 	[3, p. 3372. 
a/.	This data was provided by the planning section of the 
Food Bureau of MAFin a September 12, 1973 interview. 
In January 1971 the corresponding data were 7.70 and 
1 09 foriWarehouse and grain insurance, respectively 
Ll,p 224 7. 
A USAID study in 1971 [13, p. B-5-13-7 estimated the
 
A and NACF capacity to store bagged grain in
 
December 1970 to be 625000 metric tons.
 
j / 	It can be proved that the annual profit from storage
activities under this model is equal to the negative,
of the IOst of .holdin te carry.over when the carry " 
equals 'e arrut Sp ccl it is -br( l2(r"7~Htimes these Vorldng soks. When there is a zero 
"level of working stocks, there is zero net profit. 
Ml he euin. date of Oober196d was chosen because a different 
£ft ~ing poliywent, into'effect at that time which
alerdthe patteiin oldhiuents in -favor of early, rather thanlater sas. The+ "nng *1 "poit tor +each y,+ear+ ( ctober)'.L 
was+ oip.edibecaus. of the qlficultitea of"the om ason of 
adS.. oontlauo. result orataMel etanuous datases ith A cont 	 oe., 
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Alaebraic Analysis of the Competitive Model' 
In mathematical terms our assumption governing the com­
petitive case can be stated as 
Pl(t)- IC(t)/S(t) r P(t) + k, that the price rise equals the 
average cost of storage. Recall that P(t) - a + bS'(t) - b f(t), 
where f(t) - H(t) + 2G(t) is the portion of the demand curve 
that depends upon time alone. 
bS" - b f'(t) - ra + rbS'(t) - r b f(t) + k, or 
S"(t rS' t) =ra + k 
SI(t) - rS'(t) - r f(t) + f'(t).
b 
= SO + Slert
The solution ito the homogeneous part is S(t) 

where So and S, are constants to be determined by the initial
 
conditions of the problem. Substituting the assumed forms of
 
the G and H functions into the equation we obtain the explicit
 
form of the differential equation
 
rS'm + + 	 2 - L4 44 t3tS" - r ra 	+k 2C/18 + 2rC(I - t/18) +(t 2 -t3)H e-4t-rHte-t,
b 33' 3 
ra + k 1 r 	 j4 e-- t or S" - rS' - k+ 2C(1 + ) - rCt/9 + (3tE-(4+r)t3) 
b 18 3" 
To obtain the particular solutions to the equation, we will 
separate the expression to the right of the equality into two 
distinct portions. 
For S' -,r A- -Bt we wil tryS kt +k2t
2 
Sk+ 2 t 	 S" 
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-- BIc -p- rC u 
2 2r 9 18 
2k2 A B A C ra+lc 2C( . 
2k 2 -rk, A k, r r Ir -b 
_ 
-(r- k + L)t + • 
Thus the first particular solution 
is S(t) 

rb 3 1 
For S" - rS' = 4 H(3t 2 - (4+r)t 3 )e "4 t, we will try 
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s(t) (ko + k1t + k2t2 + k3t3 )e-t as the particular solut~on. 
=	 4ko - 2t 2 - 4k3t3)e- 4t.S'(t) 	 (k, + 2k2 t + 3k t 2 - 4k1_ 
+ 	 - 4(k, - 4ko )S,,(t) 	 (2k - ik (6k 3 -8k 2 )t - 2k 3 t2 

- 4(2k2 - 4kl)t - 4(3k3 - 4k2 )t + 16k 3 t3)e-4t.
 
• 33	 Hl6k+ 4rk3 L4H(4 +r)k3= 
= 
-8H6k2- 12k3 k3 - k3 + 4rk2 = 21	 2 
l61c - 8k2 - 8k2 + 6k3 + 4rk, - 2rk2 = 0 
l6k ;+2rk2 -	 k1I -H4(4+ r)k 1 	 6k3 
16k0 	 4, 4k 1 .+ 2k2 - rk, + 4rk 0 ,0 
4(4 + r)kO - (Slr)kl - 2k2 (8+r)(-H) -2(-2H) K -H 
So, the 	second particular solution is S(t) -H(1+t+8t 
2+32 t3) e - 4t. 
Thus, the ,generalequation describing storage behavior in this 
model is 
+r+c He-+t8 3203
 SEe-	 O2/8s~t)B + rb 3~)+ tl 
where SO and. SI win be determined by the boundary conditions 
imposed upon storage behavior. 
If we impose the conditions that S(O)mS(12)O on the 
solution, we obtain the following values for So and " 
S(O) M 0 implies SO + S, - H 0. 
S(12) - 0 implies So + el2rs 12-ra k + 20 )+ 8C - He4 8(19633) 0.%rb r 3 
-
Because e 4 8 is of the order of magnitude 10-21, the entire
 
product which involves it will be smaller than 10-10 and is
 
negligible. With that convention, we obtain
 
12H_ 2ra+k) -10 l2rSo = (e r 10 w -/(e1) and
( rb
 
.-(.2 (rek) -H + l10-l)/(e32 r-l).
rb
 
If the carry-in equals the carry-out, but is different from zero,
 
So will be increased by the amount of the carryover.
 
Now, some of the secondary relations within the model will
 
be derived. Each of these are determined once the storage levels
 
are known. The rate at which storage changes within the year is
 
S'(t) - rSler . +ra+2C )+ Ct/9 + He'0t(1 t3).
rb 3' 3 
The price level within the year is 
P(t) a + brSlert _( + -) + bCt/9 .+ bH- t3e-4t 2b.(t/18-.4) 
r 3 31
 
-bH (d)t3 0-4t. Or
 
31 
P(t) awbrSet k/r. 
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The level of gross farm income is 2 P(t) H(t), dt. 
FI(12) 152 br,,1H &4_t3.(r-4)t dt -Hk/r -((.IA-) 4brS,~ - k/r)H. 
The profit fromn government sales, ignoring storage costs, .is 12P(t)G(t)dt., 
.TX(2)uj2 brS C (-/13 + t/l8)e dt - _/rS C(-1/3 + t/18)dt.1 
b~j ._UI-e2r/3+ 12 (32eJ2r _ 1 (ekG ) 
•18 r r
 
= bSC ( 2r - (er-1)(1/3 + 1/18r)).
 
L bSIC (el2r-l).
bS1C (el2r+l) 

3 18r 
The total consumer expenditure on the commodity is 
12 P(t) D(t)dt = FY(L2) + T(12) - P(t) S'(t)dt. 
2 P(t) S'() 3 (br122rt - Slra+k)ert -rt + brSlC tert 
JI Jo 1 1 9 
+ M'8 brS1Ht3e(r-4)t)dt - (k/r) (S(32) - S(O)) 
br?1 (e2r-l) - ( + 2 S(e2r-.. 
2 r 31 
+ bLC (-e2_(er-l)/r)+ (A.) brSH
 9 4-r 
2
 
r (o24rl) + 2bS+C (er+
2 3 r 9r 
+ (4_4br) H.
 
4-r 3H 
Thus, consumer expenditure is 
ra + t~jSC) - (.12r - b) (e2'-l) kH­
r r 3. 
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the competitiveThe derivation of private storage profit in 
case-consists of the derivation of the'year-end cost of 
inventory and the negative of the accumulated gross margin 
from private sales and then adding the two to obtain the
 
negative of net private storage profits.
 
A. Derivation of Inventory Cost
 
Siat. S(r P + k)Sdt u.(br2S,!rtS kS + kS)dt 
-fbr 2 SlertSdt 
132r
+0!((e4e,)1r9.(,32;-_ )
-' (e ra+k + 3C) 12e e +2ea Sdt - r (e(rl) + r-l) ­ 3 r3rr2r 
12
~ 
rt ) 2C -H.. (-032~.L.S i+)so~S.22r (144 
18 r r 2 r3 4-r. (4-r)2 
-H(ar(3) +32( 
(4-(r)3 3(4.r)4
 
, (2r.., + .,)a(e l) .(ra+k) el2r.
(32,32r .)

rb +r2r 

23;2 r 9r3 ;29r5 
+26-_ . .22 
(4m. (4-)3 3.(4-r)44-r' 
.., " + . Z .
+ . 32r.+++++C. .  ... r . 3 (.2-,) +,(.4r- (ra~k) ,32e]2

Tb . rrr 2
 
C(22i3. 42C (032r+) (JL.+4+4) 
4-'4­4
u3-

15k (124.3r--(32~)in(1w+~I) 

1.'(. 3w,(
 
.-.+: ,+. I
++ ! +.++ . ++.2•i ++
 
Thus 	year-end inventorybrS.S 0(e 2 costr-1) +is - .(ra-k)22,2r.1€1(32) .1 	 r(e'-l) 
3'
S1S ~d - bSkS12-() . _S 5_PtS'dt ­
0- 2r rb3 r 9r 4 r+ C (_-l ) =,2rl 
B. 	 Derivation of Gross Margin 
0 	 r 
9 r 	 4-r
 
Thus 	gross margin is 
IC(22 ) 2r1) j(ra+k) a (-26_S't-= 5( S (&''1 b) 2re 
+ - + brSH 44(-7-2r)) 1 
C. Derivation of profit
 
12 -(Profit)0= 0(2) P S'dt
 
sibrc (e24-) - S1(ra+k) (2 ) + brSSo(e ) 
- s(r ( ) + +21eH 
r 
. br2 (Si= 24-(.r + ) 1 2 -2rgraLkI1 (e3 2r.-l - + H) ( e) 
Sbr81(S.(e:Ir.1) + H 32 r ,ra+k e r + H) 
.,-brj.el(S.(e2 .) + (-2(±.)) (e]2r+1 )) frm the boundary 
b •iondatinso S(O)f (pr)"O 
- b( 1( ) - 5 1 (or)-()) e obtai
 
ii prI
 
tb.w. . .j ' ......p +ote, r-1) w e quaLHo "-b8 ." 
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AIebrio-ka~aysi.s .of the Monoolistic model 
In the monopo2istic model we maxdziLise year-end private 
Storage profits: 
(Py -81(y)) - Id(y)Jdy or Min S S'(Y) + IC(y)Jdy 
Recall that 
S,(t) - H(t) + G(t) - D(t), so that D(t) H(t) + G(t) - S.(t) and
 
P(t) ­ a - b(D(t) + G(t)). If we let f(t) -,H(t) + 2G(t), then
 
the demand curve becomes P(t) 
 a + bS'(t) - b f(t). The inventor7
 
cost equation is IC(t) - r P(t) S(t) + k S(t).
 
For this variation problem, F(S,S', t) - p(t) S'(t) + IC(t).
 
To obtain the components of the Baler Equation:
 
2= r P(t) + k,9S
 
F P(t) + S (t)2P + r S(t)%P =P(t)+b(S+rS), and
 
8'ast
 
- bS" - bf' + b(S" + rS'). 
dt W'
 
Thus the Baler equation is
 
ra + rbS' - rbf + k - bS" + bf' - bS" - rbS' - 0. 
ra + k - rbf + bf' 2b8", 
-2b 2 
The solution to the homogeneous part of the equation i 
S so + Sits 
-where 8 and S e constants to be determined later, using the 
initial conitions. Substituting back for,fin the nonhoiogeneous
 
equatio, we wil proceed to obtain the set of particular solutions
 
to be eqution.
 
-
2W - .*k MIHt'e-4t + 2rC/3 - 2Qrt/18 + H(3t2 - 4t3)e 4t + 2C/18. 
b, 
This can be rearranged to be 
3e"
2S.. + 20(r/3 + 1/18) - Crt/9 + 3H 26tet - (rUH + 4H1 )t 4t, or 
b 
2
25"=A - Crt/9 + H (3t - (4 + r)t3)e 4t.
 
Consider the portion which is 
SO rn - C(r/18)t.
 
2
 
S k2 t 2 + k t3 would be a particular solution.
 
3
 
S' 2k2t + 3k~t2
 
S" 2k2 +6kt
 
From this, we get
 
k3 -rC/lOS 
= , , + C r 
2k mA/2 k .AA4 /4( ,C-+g) 
6k rC/8  
b3
22 
Now, consider the portion which is
 
s - (H/2)(3t2 - (4 + r)t3)e 4 t. 
y S-( + klt + k2t2 + k3t3)e'4t as a particular solution..
 
-4(koS1 e'4 (k1 + 2kt + 3k t 2 + klt + k2 t 2 + k3t3)). 
3- et(22 - 4k +,(k -k)t - kt - 4(kl.- 4k + (2 k j") 
. (') 3 - k2 
. )t 4k t)).

S 2 3 
325'. 
3 21 
24 32 
26k2 ::,mi am kH (+ r) H(/ -'3/4(4+r.)) 1.~ 3/+~ 
532 256 5J642 
9 4 . - 3. )2t r) +2b 
-6o: +(+4k(aj~m~2k2~ 0 (4 k kr~ 
2~~mw 
22 
1C4etingSJo the phoeneou andte 
.0 V ot. 4behavio 
3
 
pareticla spouio'ttwo
 
.It 5(0) =O, this implies that0:o that. 
0 2
 
S + H
 
o 2 
If S(22) 0,this implies that 
3+ 12(S 1 + r(3a+2bCyb) + 4( 9kL+b bC ) _ 16rC 
H6e-48( 1 + r + 244 18r + 576 + 288r + 1728(. 16 +-4r ))_ , or 
2 3 
+ 22S, + 8r0 + 4C + 36ar/b + 36k/b - He-48 (9816.5 + 2610.5r).So 
Since 1log 1 (e "4) -20.846135, we can neglect the last term.
 
I 0 )  
32Si I+ - 4C - ( 6ar + 36k )+ (i0 - 3 or_1 r .)H -8rC 
b
-~2 
S, )H' 2rC/3 - 0/h 3ra/b - 3k/b + O 
24 
If the carry-in at the beginning of the year were equal to the 
cafl7-out at the end of the year, the only thing which would differ 
is S, which would then be increased by the amount of the carryover. 
Athupoit M of, US seconAry relation,within the 
r­aodelwillbe iud. Each:of the.. is,determined Ceas the
 
Therat0o chnge f storage is described bj 
-s't +(2 4 a2bC -~ rC (!)2'
l~b 6b 6 
+4t2 2- 1 j4t((4+3r ) + (8+4)t + (26 + 49 - 2 - 2r - (84+6r)t- (6+r)t 
2 
3 
#()S k+ra + (1' !)r C 2 H-4t 2 
8'(~m+(.-.C(..+.))inzCt/6) -H _r/2 2rb 4rt2 
1 2b 18 3 
(_4+1 r)t3). 
3 
+b + c.1 + E))t -- rC(t/6)2 + Ao-12+2t+4t+3+6/3t3 
+At 3He4 
3 
The price equation inP(t) - .- bH(t) - 2bG(t) + bS,(t), or
 
.//6t1 ++oe+ + + 1+ e0"t (2/++4++ t ),o 
6 3)) 
3t; +2bC/3 

ne 'evm"64" b . +rk m
 
SP(t) a ,-+j o 0 b. + (.2+ bCr3 - 3/1)t.- rbC¢/6)2 
b9+.Z+t . + , ~P , ., 2W/3.. + .,-) i.
•~~Cr : r. C.6.,/6 
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upper limit (twelve) is eufflcient large that we can approximate
 
the definite integra3a involving e b the corroepo
 
functions with no discernible errors
 
Gross fam income for the year isn P(t) H(t)dt.
 
asF .(32) 0 (a+bS,,42bC/3)H 1 	 t3etO + S22 (.--+bC( - 81)H 1 .8-4,dt 
o 3 Jo 	 e 
L2 128 t etdt + 	 -8dt82 35 
( 	3) wH~a--bS--2bC/3) + H(- 2 + bC( /3 - 10)) r- . t e c
 
2 3~)) HrbC
 
+ rbl2/32 + rb/216 + 3rbH2/64 + 	5rbH2/64 - 5b/26. 
Fr(12) 	-H(a+bS,+2bC/) + H kr- + bCr/ - - rbCH/144

2
 
+ rbH2/4- /16.
 
The profits from goveruent sales# ignoring their holding costs, is
 
S2P(t) G(t~dt. 
TX(. 2) -(.+2bo/3+)s 1)Y2 (-213 + t/1e)cit + k+ 'b 232;(t t2 t 
.c.32)-)@-4tdt 
t 2 t3rb~2 	 2122 112.24 64 3inmS~mm~m+~)dt rbCH,(Itm.t( m...) 
-
2 
A+ 
9,24 288' 288' 19 6r, 
2 7b
u~i~~f~ 2 ).. rbC H'+ 

76tW: oonaI~ir extponditim. on the cowodity for the Year is 
.(t) D(t)dt'. Since D(t) -H(t) +Gt 
X(32) -Fr(22) +Uj(22) - P(t) 8'1(t)dt. 
12 Ic+ra 112 p~)22 
.S P~tS'(t)#l n (a+2b0/3+bS,)S'(t)dt+J (..-+b(-~ ))S] dt
 
)0. 2~,r1_- _O
)rl3 +br22(t/6) 7dt
+J.-

b 3 9 18 36 33
J' 2b 
,~Ca /3)+(4 142!.)+4rC rC 2 1raae'+ j /3t(S2b ) dSo~l/t2b 
1 ra rCki-ra 32rC-2r 3rC5 d
-rt -2Ct

+S1 rbO4(.J4_ -CrC) 16(-+-3 9 3b 9 9 9 
11 64 3-4t 64 4e 4t. 642 
27 39 
2r.2 1 CJ
k~ra)2r(k+ra) 

'j2(LEI +bC(r/3 - 'IS))S,+576b((.)~3
 2b 3b 32932 
2 2 k+ra 47rCj2i-Cb 19 2 H~aS /3)6+4S CrH. .*+2S 4mTC/)/32)S+(1Ml4rC(k41'&6.')+:f. b b,22b'13, ~ 
(kr 23Src)43jr;/38 bHS, CbH 5b112 
b bcH7 2 248 
2 3 b 7 2. 3J 32 
16: b , 5a 
+~ ~ jf a',(IIw. 
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Total consumer expenditure will-be
 
x(12) - H(a+b 2bC1 k1)+b (H - - + 
3 2 3 18 344 4 
12--8rb02 31rbCH + 7bCH 
- +6 ' 37 18 3m - -3 "- 364bCkr)SC( 
+ r+ 32br2 C25b+2 + k+ra 25c)+ HE'X(L?

2 b 576 2 . 71832 5
 
l6bC2 . 4 2 
 (_r) C (8r-4).S 
-48rH(k---a), +- + (k+ra) a--13 ­9 b 
-51
X(32)- H(ia4tl + 2bC/3) + H(~~ + -22 rbCH + rb2 2 + 4bC 2 2 576 4 32 3 
+4C(k+ra) + 7bCH - rbH !1*- !rH(k4Ta)-. 55 rACH
 
36 2 16 i76
 
32br2 -4BrC(k+ra) - 36S,(ki-ra) + E (lc+ra) 2 -bCS(Sr-4). 
.
X(12) all + bHS,(2 - r/2),- bCS1(8r_4) + bHC(I + 79r 55r
2 
2 576 576
.36 

+ b2(r/4 - 5/32) + 4 + (k+ra) fH(I- 5r)+C(4-48r)-36SJ7 
4 a2 32br22 
2r~,
!! (k+ra)2 ­-
b5
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Ssidc hrnoiples fro the. Calculus of Varations, 
The method of optiuisationapplied to the profit equation 
in the analysis of the monopoly model differs from that inmuch 
of economic analysis in that it selects a time-varying path 
of optimal response rather than a single rate - it- selects an 
optimal function rather than an optimal value of a variable. 
Because the theor7 underlying this process (the calculus of 
variations) is likely unfamiliar to many economists, 1/ it is 
given some detail here.2/
 
First Order Conditions Necessary for an Etremum: We start
 
the discussion by introducing the concept of a functional. A 
functional is a rule of correspondence (i.e. function) wtich 
assigns a specific (real) number to each function or curve
 
belonging to sane class of functions or curves. This parent
 
class of functions will usually be a normed linear sDace, which, 
heuristically speaking, is a set of elements and a function 
(its norm) with which measure the "distance" between the elements 
of the set. For example, the class Dl(ab) of continuous 
functions which have continuous first derivatives on the interval 
fa bJ together with the norm//y//1 "max /7(x)/+ max 
&SXO ajx-&
isa noaed linear space. 
Th. Concept of continity of a functional isanalogous to 
the oneptwith respect to functions, with the norm of the 
space h hiotiona.is defined'used,.as theuon vi 

measure of "distance" between arguments of the functional., 
It is often useful to distinguish linear functionals from
 
others. If J(h) is a functional defined on a normed linear
 
space R, it is said to be a continuous linear functional if
 
1. J(ah) - aJ(h) for any h in R and any real number a; 
2. J(hl + h2) - J(hI) + J(h2) for any hl and h2 in R; and 
3. J(h) is continuous for all h in R. 
Suppose that the increment of the functional, which is 
NJ(h) ' = J(y+h) - J(y), can be written as the sum of a linear 
functional and an error: AJ(h) = 4SJ(h) +f//h/I. T the limit 
of the error ( ) is .zero as the norm of h goes to zero, the 
functional is said to be differentiable and the principal linear
 
part of the increment, 6J(h),.is called the first variation of
 
the functional J(h).
 
The functional.J(y) is said to have a (relative) extremum
 
A Afor the curve y = y(x) if J(y) - J(y) does not change its sign
 
for all curves y in a neighborhoody/ of y = (x). This extremum 
is called a weak extremum if the norm used in defining the 
neighborhood is the norm for the class of first order continu­
ously differentiable functions, and is called a stronr extremum 
if the norm is that for the class of continuous fnctions.h
/ 
A necessar7 condition for the differentiable functional
 
.J(y) to have an extrmi for - ,is 
 that Its variation
 
vanish for y y. That is, 
 for all Amotions h belonging to 
the set (h: f 9 -y1 l //h//< f defined by isam fixed, but perhaps 
smal1 0, jJ(h) -0. 
The first application of this theorem gives rise to Eiler s 
equation in the calculus of variations. Let J(y) be a functional 
of teornJ F(xpytyl)dx defined on the set of functions
 
which have continuous first derivatives in Ea,bJ and satisfy
 
the boundary conditionsy/7(a) =

- A and y(b) 'B. Then a necessary 
condition for J(y) anto -ave extremum for a function y(x) is that 
y(X) satisfy Baler's euation OF -- _A aF 0.
 
Zy dx ey'
 
Second Order Conditions Sufficient 
for Minimization: The
 
first order Pondition for minimizing a functional requires that
 
the first variation of the functional vanish for the extremal 
curve. This requirement is very similar to the first order 
on11dition for the munimisation of a function, namely that the 
first derivative is Sero at the extresU . This would lead one 
to expect that there maY be similarities between the second order 
conditions pertaining to the calculus of Variations and those 
used in real analysis. To illustrate these similarties, the 
seoond order conditions will be statedin two ways - the conditions 
in general, and the conditions which correspond to functionals of 
the type analyzed in this paper. However, before the-second'
 
order conditions can be given, our vocabulary must be extended
 
and some background results.stated.
6
 
A functional J(y) is said to be twice differentiable if
 
its increment can be written in the form 
AJ(h) =6J(h) + 6 2 j(h) 
where SJ(h) is a linear functional &iz first variation), 62J(h) 
is a quadratic functionaly!and the error , has the limit of zero 
as the norm of h approaches zero. The quadratic functional 
s2J(h) is called the second variation of the functional J(y). 
A necessary condition for the functional J(y) to have a 
rinimn for the extremal curve y - (x)is that 62 j(y) 0, for 
*y ' and all admissable h. However, this condition alone is not 
sufficient to assure a minimum, nor is the imposition .ofthe 
requirement that 62J(y)) 0 sufficient.8 In order to define a 
sufficient condition another concept is needed: A quadratic 
normed linear space is strongly
functional *(h) defined on a 

nositive2/if there exists some positive constant k such that
 
(h)a I//h/ 2 for all h.
 
to have

.hus, a sufficient condition for the functional J(y) 
A A 
a O Wat yyx given Ithat 8Jy ofor yrny, is that its 
2A
.eadvariation. £JW-)be strong3i positive for y y­
Tse necessar7 and sufficient conditions for the existence 
of a amin for:a ftntional describe bounds on the behavior of 
the funotional which may not, necessarily, lead to recognizable 
bounds on the structure of the functional. In particular, it 
is not iediatly clear what restrictions on F(x,y,yt) are implied 
for our analysis of J(y) b F(x,y.,yl)dx. 
Legendre' s ineuality corresponds to the necessary condition 
stated above: Anecessary condition for the functional 
Flx, y, y(a) = a minimum atJ(Y) -S. )dx, A, y() MB to have 
A that (xyy,)ZO for every point of the curveu"(x) is Z2F 
yu'y(x) i ta 
In order to give us the strong positivity condition used 
in the sufficient condition, we must have a condition which rules 
out, for example, the eastward path on the great circle as the 
shortest distance between New York and San Francisco.o 1 / This 
condition is "the absence of conaugate points. 
The second variation of the functional J(y) - F(X'Oysy')dx 
,(a)-A, y(b) -Bcan be written as 
2J(h) jb (P h,2 + Q h2 )dx with h(a) -h(b)- 0 
where. P j 2 F ' (1 d 
dx 
a iF 
y ) 
N10oc that the -second aration is also a. functional, which. 
if positive definite, is nonnegative with a minimn value of 
zero and otherwise is negative and unbounded. Thus by minimizing 
this functional we can determine whether the second variation is 
positive definite. The concept of conjugate points is derived
 
c
from this optimization process. The point a ( a) ia said to be 
conJugate to the point a with respect to the functional J(y) if 
the solution, h*(x), to the equation- Q - A Ph- = 0 vanishes 
dx 
for x - a(i.e. h*(a) = 0) and for x = ac , but h*(x) is not 
identically zero. The generalization of this definition to
 
the case of more than one unknown function involves demonstrat­
ing the linear dependence of the set of disturbance functions
 
aCat the point x 

The absence of conjugate points is predicted by Jacobi's
 
necessary condition. If the extremal y = '(x)corresponds to a 
minimum of the functionalS F(x,y,y')dx and if ) 0F 
(or is positive definite in the multivariate case) along this 
extremal, then the open interval (a,b) contains no points conjugate 
to a. 
This bring us to the point where we can now state a set of 
conditione sufficient to establish the minimum of the functional 
Aiil,1 y(b)F1xsypyl)dx, y(a) an - B. If some adiusable.r 
ouve , ~x simnultaeous] Itat iation the following: three. 
conditions, a waku of the stated functional Wists 
at ;4'(x), 
1. 	 The curve 4(x) is extrea,', which means it satisfies 
the Ruler equation: 
dx. 3' 
2. 	 Along the curve y - W(x), the strengthened Legendre 
condition is satisfied: 
P(x) _2'a F(x,y') 0 (or is positive definite). 
3. 	 And it fulfills the strenhened Jacobi condition, that 
the dlosed interval Ea,bJ contains no points conjugate 
to the point a. 
The characteristic of these sufficient conditions which 
makes them sufficient is the fact that all three must hold 
simultaneouply. If any one of the conditions breaks down, we 
longer be assured that a minimum has been attained.can no 
In sutmory, this section of the appendix has presented the 
conditions sufficient to establish the minim= of a flunctional 
in two cases. First, the minimisation of a general functional was 
discussed. Then, the conditions regarding the minimization of 
the partiCulr tyje of functional used in this paper, namely 
where the "functional is defined -y the integral of a function 
whose arguments are an independent variable, a dependent 
variable which responds to the independent variable and the 
rate of change of that dependent variable. 
ABMUin n~r: The necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the minimization of a functional are quite similar to those
 
for minimizing a function. The first variation of the functiona 
must necessarily vanish for any extremal solution, as must the 
first derivative of a function. To assure that a minimum of 
the functional has been obtained, the second variatior. of the
 
functional must be strongly positive for the extremal solution. 
This is an obvious parallel to the requirement that the second 
derivative of a function be positive at its minimum. 
rb
For functionals that can be represented as b F(x,y,y')dx 
these necessary and sufficient conditions Are represented by 
the Euler eauation the strengthened Legendre condiion, and the 
strengthened.Jacobi condition, all of which have been referred 
to above. For a much more complete discussion of this topic, 
the reader is advised to consult the author's reference C4J or 
smasother text on the subject. 
~/~d~Pec8~iv (n pe n: a apiati on of the 
an ]onaoslm f11111casas1d s. e, 	 G.D. 
joj 	 boo tosaive scuss$o6nbot the cawulus fo 
vaitinsA, seti ,of a chapte ind one topic in­
the:set Rdview sctI o o oa ter*I Mathematical. 
and Fomin s tened afterGelfAn pse whi 
h/lAnihorhood o i defined a ~ 
for soe fixed: poitive real: number ~.*The norm which 
i's used in thsdefiniion..is- the norm of the function 
epace in whic*h we "are.operating. 
/ The norm for .theset of first order differentiable f,.nctions
is defined. as: tm/ 	 /y(x)/ + max /yI(x)/. The nom 
xx 
for the set of continuous functions is defined as 
10-max/(x)/. In each case the maxi zation is 
x 
occurring over a domain for which y(x) and J(y) are defined. 
1/Auler's equation is a second order differential equation 
whose solution contains :two arbitrary constants. The two 
stated coditiont , or an pair of independent conditions, 
are used-to deterdne the specific parameters of the solution
equation; In partimaarp-,we could Just as well use y(a) - A 
iand y'(a) - as Lal.ters.,tiv* conditions on (x). 
Is.,Preentat1 Is -patterned.after.GelfAnd and Fomin 
Aj. or 	 a, nomed linearfuncioi4D+,ftwo 'Aemento 
sp ace9 i sa :4tpbe u if it:is a : lnear functional 
of)fo.yfzd iT~n~a untonlof x for any'L 
4-cdyIf 'the 'twoA09 e fablierfntoa 
b~~new0 	 undtenal 
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Footnotes 
Cont. 
_ 	Ifwe can determine a sequence of functions
 
hlhh . with li:11h -0, such that for 
every k) 0 we can find Nk such that k?-(hn)>NJ ) > 0 
for all n greater than Nk, then AJ(h)4O for this 
sequence and hence the functional would not be minimized. 
This would be the situation if a saddle point occurred. 
2/ 	 This concept is to be compared with the concept of positive 
definiteness. A quadratic functional A(x) is positive 
definite if A(x)> 0 for every nonzero element x. In a 
finite dimensional space, a strongly positive quadratic 
form is equivalent to a positive definite quadratic form, 
but in the general case strong positivity is a more 
stringent condition than positive definiteness. 
I 	 This example isdue to Lancaster E7, P.3a27. 
/ This equation is called the Jacobi eguation of the original 
functional J(y). It is the Baler equation derived in the 
minimization of 62 J(h). 
]/ 	 The derived curve y _ y(x) is that curve in the class of 
first order continuously differentiable curves which 
minimizes the functional. A strong extremum woId occur 
ifthe derived curve is that element of the setl of 
continuous curves which minimizes the functional. 
